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Abstract
The period prior to the 1990's marked the ANC as a liberation movement, perceived by
many as being in favour of nationalization and a state controlled economy. The advent of
democracy and the ANC's assumption of political power have, however, seen a change in
the ANC elites' policy rhetoric, practice and approach to policy formulation. This essay
examines the extent to which elite views and attitudes have shifted from nationalization to
privatization. It notes that while the ANC government has been persuing and implementing
Gear and its privatization component, its elite seems to be less supportive and to some
extent ambivalent on the question. In addition, continued implementation of Gear and its
privatization elements, in spite of reservations by the majority of the elites supporting the
ANC, reveals a technocratie nature in approach to policy-making on the part of the ANC-led
government.
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Opsomming
Voor 1990 was die ANC oor die algemeen beskou as 'n bevrydingsorganisasie, ten gunste
van nasionalisering en 'n staatsbeheerde ekonomie. Met die totstandkoming van
demokrasie en die ANC se aanname van politieke mag, het daar 'n verandering
plaasgevind onder ANC elite ten opsigte van beleidsretoriek, praktyk en hulle benadering
betreffende beleidsformulering. Hierdie studie ondersoek tot hoe 'n mate die elite se
sieninge en houdings verskuif het vanaf nasionalisering na privatisering. Terwyl die ANC
regering GEAR implementeer met sy privatiseringkomponent, is die ANC elite al minder
ondersteunend t.o.v die privatiseringskwessie; om die waarheid te sê, hul standpunt hieroor
is tot 'n mate dubbelsinnig. Verder toon die implementering van GEAR, en sy
privatiseringselement, ten spyte van bedenkinge onder die meerderheid van die elite wat
die ANC ondersteun, 'n toenemende tegnokratiese benadering tot beleidsmaking aan die
kant van die ANC regering.
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1Chapter One
Background and the Problem
1.1 Introduction
In 1996, Raymond Louw (1996:2) asserted with reference to Mandela's views (that
"privatization is the fundamental policy of the ANC and it is going to be implemented" on
economic policy, "the South African president (Nelson Mandela) has undergone the
political equivalent of a religious conversion, comparable in its profundity - though not in
its time scale - with that experienced by Saul on the Road of Damascus".
Louw's assertion serves to summarize and shed some light on the theme of this
assignment. The objective here is to explore how the actions, views, utterances, and
attitudes of persons such as Mandela, impact on and affect public policy. The focus will be
on economic policy shifts on the part of the ANC in particular and government in general.
The reader will be drawn into the role played by elites supporting or belonging to the
African National Congress in policy transformation within both the government and the
African National Congress. Such an exercise will be both descriptive and evaluative in
form.
For the purpose of clarity, since the focus is on the role played by elites on policy
transformation, it is necessary to provide a definition of elites (An in depth discussion and
explanation of the concept will be done in another part of this assignment). Elites are, as
defined by Higley (quoted in Kotzé, 1992:viii), " those persons who hold authoritative
positions in powerful public and private organizations and influential movements, and are
therefore able to affect strategic decisions regularly". This means that elites are not only
found in political circles but also in other societal sectors such as amongst others the
business sector, the media, non-governmental organizations and the trade union
movement.
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2The focus here is not the elite per se, but how the elites supporting the ruling ANC, moved
with the ANC's policy shift from nationalization to privatization. The ANC, as a ruling party,
is the major influential institution in policy matters in South Africa. Therefore, it is important
to focus on its opinon-Ieaders or elite. The assessment will focus mainly on the period from
1990 to 2000. Because it is the period that can, arguably, be said to have witnessed a
noticeable shift from the rhetoric of nationalization to actual implementation of privatization
measures. As to how this change on economic stance has come about, will be explored in
this assignment.
The period prior to the 1990s and the early part of the 1990s mark a phase in which
nationalization seemed to be the central aspect of the ANC's economic policy. No one
attests to this more clearly than Mandela 1. Upon his release in 1990, Mandela declared, "
the nationalization of mines, banks, and monopoly industry is the policy of the ANC"
(Marais: 1998:146). For Mandela, any shift of position with respect to nationalization was
"inconceivable at that time (Marais: 1998:146). However, in the latter part of the 1990s,
the "religious conversion" alluded to by Louw began to emerge. In May 1996, Mandela
claimed that "Privatisation is the fundamental policy of the ANC and it is going to be
implemented" (Louw: 1996:2). Both of the above statements were made by one man but
when compared seemed like diametrical opposites. With reference to the above, one can
say that the ANC was faced with economic policy dilemmas, first as a liberation movement
and later as a governing party.
In tracing the ANC's economic policy, one must analyze the above statement made by
Mandela relating to the nationalization of mines banks and the monopoly industry and
certain clauses within the Freedom Charter dealing with the same aspects.
I Mandela was then the deputy president, just recently released from twenty-seven years in jail for his opposition to
apartheeid. And because of that, Mandela was a political icon among the black South Africans.
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3Here Mandela virtually replicated the relevant clause in the Freedom Charter, which said,
in part that: "the mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be
transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole" (Davies: 1987:85). The Freedom
Charter does not actually use the word "nationalization", but (the above) sentence in the
Charter dealing with the "transfer to the ownership of the people as a whole", has been
generally understood to mean nationalization (Malinga: 1990:23).
To substantiate this point further, in a comment on the Freedom Charter written in 1955
Mandela said: "It is true that in demanding the nationalization of the banks, the gold mines
and the land the Charter strikes a fatal blow at the financial and gold mining monopolies
and farming interests ...But such a step is absolutely imperative and necessary because
the Charter is inconceivable until the monopolies are first smashed and the national wealth
of the country turned over to the people" (African Business, SeptlOct:1990:21).
Prior to its coming to power (through its historical election victory in 1994), the ANC did not
have an official economic policy, except for a range of widely interpreted statements on
this section of the Freedom Charter. The reason why that was the case, is most probably
because in 1955 nationalization was a more respectable form of economic policy than it is
today. Secondly, the ANC has for a long time been an organization representing a broad
range of interests and opinions. Lastly, the ANC has had little time to formulate an
elaborate and coherent economic policy for the post-apartheid dispensation (Fine:
1990:14).
When the ANC began to seriously consider formulating an economic policy, it published its
1988 Constitutional Guidelines, where it states the following provisions for the economy:
"The state shall ensure that the entire economy serves the interests and well-being of all
sections of the population.
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4The state shall have the right to determine the general context in which economic life takes
place and define and limit the rights and obligations attached to the ownership and use of
private productive capacity.
The economy shall be a mixed one, with a public sector, a private sector, a co-operative
sector and a small family sector. Co-operative forms of economic enterprise, village
industries and small-scale family activities shall be supported by the state.
The state shall promote the acquisition of managerial, technical and scientific skills among
all sections of the population, especially blacks. Property for personal use and
consumption shall be constitutionally protected"(ANC, Constitutional Guideline: 1988 in
Holdt: 1990:45).
Immediately after the ban on the ANC was lifted in February 1990, senior ANC leaders
proposed nationalization as part of its economic policy (Scheidman: 1990:2). However,
they were cautious. For example, on 25 April 1990, Mandela said that thorough research
would be undertaken before the ANC adopts a firm stance on nationalization. Thabo Mbeki
(then the ANC's Director for International Relations), on the other hand, acknowledged that
nationalization was a legitimate mechanism for addressing the distribution of wealth, he
said "nationalization is only one option that has to be considered in the context of a host of
other issues, including tax and fiscal policy, regulation of the markets and international
economic relations" (Scheidman: 1990:4).
The process of economic policy formulation was evident when the ANC, in its 1991
congress, decided to set aside a session for economic policy formulation to take place in
1992. The 1991/92 economic policy resolutions appeared to be flexible and pragmatic on
issues of the role of the state in economy (see Lodge: 1992:71 and ANC, Draft Resolution
on Economic Policy: 1991:3).
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5The Reconstruction and Development Programme (ROP) (which was formulated mainly by
the Congress of South African Trade Unions and adopted by the ANC as its manifesto just
before the 27 April 1994 elections) was not different from the earlier (1991/92) ANC
economic proposals. The ROP suggested that the public sector would need to "strengthen
the ability of the economy to respond to inequalities" and to promote growth.
It might even have to be enlarged, the ROP speculated, "through, for example
nationalization," or it might have to be reduced "through privatization". Privatisation
measures might promote efficiency, affirmative action, and in general empower the
historically oppressed (Lodge: 1999:11). It was only with the introduction of Gear, in 1996,
did the real signs of policy shift became visible. The key element of Gear policy framework
is full or partial privatization.
1.2 Why Elites?
This research assignment focuses on the perceptions of the elites, supporting the ANC, on
economic policy-making. In this assignment the author will in particular look at the
perceptions of the elites and their rating of economic policy matters within the government.
However, before we look at that, it is important to know who the elites are? Elites are
"those persons who hold authoritative positions in powerful public and private
organizations and influential movements, and are therefore able to affect strategic
decisions regularly" (Higley in Kotzé: 1992:vii). In other words elites are persons with
power that individually, regularly, and seriously act to affect political outcomes (Higley et
al: 1976:60).
It is through studying elite perceptions and attitudes that studies like this one hope to shed
light onto the South African political process, as elites occupy legitimised positions of
authority (Van der Merwe and et al: 1974:1). In terms of public policy, Anderson (1984:28-
29) argues that public policy could be regarded as reflecting the values and preferences of
the governing elite.
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6The essential argument of elite theory, a theory which is used as point of departure in this
study, is that public policy is not determined by the demands and actions of the people or
the masses but rather by a ruling elite whose preferences are carried into effect by public
officials and agencies. Lasswell and Lerner (1965:20) however, argued that the public
also exercises influence on group policy, even though their influence is presumably far
less compared to the elites.
Apart from theoretical insights, which studies such as this can provide on the nature of the
ANC and elite per se, this study is an attempt to demonstrate how the ANC elite drove the
policy shift from nationalization to privatization. It can be contended that the ANC elites
{leaders) and those who held high positions in the government are the ones who drove the
process of shift from nationalization to privatization.
Political and economic analysts such as Nattrass (1992 and 1994), Lodge (1999), support
the above assertion and they argued that the grassroots members of the ANC and its
allies (COSATU, South African Communist Party (SACP) and South African National Civic
Organization (SANCO) were in favour of nationalization and totally opposed to
privatization, but the powerful elites within the ANC drove the process of change in the
opposite direction. The following section will present the research problem and design.
Brief overview of the economic policy evolution and transformations within the ANC will be
presented in Chapter Two.
1.3 Research problem
The research problem that this project seeks to investigate is the extent to which the ANC
elite has moved away from nationalization to privatization policies during the 1990s. This
will be investigated by looking at the attitudes of the elites on the state versus the market;
Gear and Privatization, all key economic policy issues.
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71.4 Research Design
The best way to address the research problem that has been identified is to do a
descriptive study. Descriptive studies help to describe situations and events. According to
Babbie et al (2001 :80), the researcher describes what was observed.
Because scientific observation is careful and deliberate, however, scientific descriptions
are typically more accurate and precise than casual ones. It is possible to do an in-depth
description of an ANC elites attitude on nationalization and privatization issues.
A descriptive study design would enable the study to:
• document an accurate profile of the ANC economic policy background;
• clarify a sequence, set of stages, or steps in the change of the ANC elite attitudes
on nationalization - steps that marked the policy shift;
• describe the shift in elite attitude on the privatisation issues
In order to accurately describe the ANC elite shift from nationalization to privatization, this
assignment will employ both qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection and
analysis, because both of them can be used in descriptive study designs (see Babbie et ai,
2001: 85 and Neuman, 2000:33). According to Neuman (1999:30), the quantitative
technique is a technique of collecting data in the form of numbers. The qualitative
technique, on the other hand, is a technique of collecting data in the form of words or
pictures.
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8In chapter two, this assignment will employ qualitative techniques of data gathering.
Qualitative techniques are very good in describing and documenting the historical events.
The primary goal of Chapter Two is to describe the evolution of the ANC economic policy
and the role that has been played by its leaders in policy formulation.
There are different types of qualitative methods (for example Field Research and
Historical-Comparative Research) (see Neuman, 1999). Qualitative studies, particular in
this assignment, will typically use qualitative methods of gaining access to research
subjects (for example books, academic journal, and newspaper articles). Secondary
sources will be used in chapter two, where an in-depth description of the ANC elite's
attitude on nationalization and privatization will be thoroughly investigated and presented.
A quantitative approach has many techniques of data gathering, and arguably the most
important one is that of surveys. According to 8abbie et al (2001 :33/4), a survey
researcher asks people questions in a written questionnaire (mailed or handed to people)
or during an interview, then records answers. The researcher manipulates no situation or
condition while people simply answer questions. In survey research, the researcher asks
many people questions in a short time period. The researcher typically summarizes
answers to questions in percentages, tables, or graphs. Surveys give the researcher a
picture of what many people think or report doing.
A survey often uses samples of selected people, but generalizes results to a larger group
from which the smaller group was chosen (see Neuman (1999 and 2000). Quantitative
methods will be used in a slightly different form in chapter three. Although, in this case
there will be no generalization to a larger group because the chosen elites are fairly
representative of the South African elite.
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9This study will employ a process of secondary data analysis. The Centre for International
Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch (CICP) has done elite surveys from
1990 up until 2000 on important policy issues including nationalization and privatization. In
chapter three of this assignment, the researcher will use that data, to look at when and to
what extent the ANC elite attitude has changed from nationalization to privatization
policies. Lastly, chapter four will be the overall conclusion of the entire assignment.
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Chapter Two
From Nationalization to Privatization
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will mainly discuss the perceived shift of the ANC from nationalization to
privatization. The first part of the chapter will explain some of the concepts that form an
integral part of this study and in the second part of the chapter these concepts will be used
to qualitatively analyze the shift in rhetoric from nationalization to privatization among the
ANC policy elite.
2.2 The Concepts
The larger conception of how best to explain or understand the problem that has been
identified is to investigate its origin. In this case it is to investigate the theoretical origin of
elites, nationalization and privatization, so that one can be able to get a comprehensive
understanding of the concepts. This will be useful for the purposes of operationalization
and measurements of the concepts in the following chapter. Therefore, this section will
consist of three sections in the following format:
• Elites
• Nationalization
• Privatization
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2.2.1. Elites
In some of the first explanations of the concept 'elite' both Pareto and Mosca (in Battomer,
1964: 1-9), have defined it narrowly as "... a minority which rules over the rest of the
society ... the political class or governing elite and more vaguely as those who can directly
influence political decision". Later studies such as those of Van Wyk (1987: 65), have
extended Pareto and Mosca's narrow parameters considerably. The term 'elites' is now
generally applied to mainly occupational, groups, which have a high status in the society.
Furthermore, elite groups are composed of a number of groups, which may be engaged in
varying degrees of co-operation, competition or conflict with each other.
Roberts (1971: 72-72) elaborates on this by saying the minority within a social collectivity
(for example society, state, a religious institutions, political party), which exercise
preponderant influence in that collectivity can be called elite?
2.2.1.1. Elite Approaches
Although, there are differences in approach and focus, the definitions of elite convey
essentially the same content, namely, that largely through their own efforts a minority of
individuals fill socially valued positions related to the functioning of society which enable
them to exert social power (Dreyer: 1989: 8). It is sufficient for this assignment to regard
the elite supporting the ANC as the incumbents of functionally important positions in the
ANC and in broader South African society. They gained their elite status through
achievement in various sectors within and outside the ANC and then became opinion-
leaders or elite (these two terms will be used interchangeably in this assignment) to the
broader South African society. According to Putnam (1976:15-17), there are three main
procedures for the identification of individuals in the elite positional approach, reputational
approach and decision-making approach.
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2.2.1.2. Positional Approach
According to Dreyer (1989:8) the positional approach has its origin in the work of Mills.
This approach suggests that the only way to identify elites is through the formal institutions
of government and in society at large. According to this approach only those that hold high
position in important societal institutions are regarded as elites.
Because formal institutions usually keep good records, positional analysis is the easiest
and most common technique for finding the powerful elites (Putnam: 1976:16). Criticism of
this approach mainly concerns the assumption that all social power is found in
organizations while informal power is negated.
2.2.1.3 Reputational Approach
According to the reputational approach, elites are not identified on the basis of their status
on formal organization, but on informal reputations in the society in which they live in.
Some researchers set out to discover who has power by querying informants who are
presumed to have observed political machinations from close up. It does allow the analyst
to discover powerful persons with indirect influence. However, reputational analysis also
has grave weaknesses, for a researcher using this method must decide whom to ask and
what to ask. Errors in choosing informants may irreparably bias results (see Putnam,
1976:17; Dreyer, 1989:9).
2.2.1.4 Decision-Making Approach
This method, sometimes also called event analysis, is based on the assumption that if
political power is defined in terms of influence over government activities, we can detect it
by studying how specific decisions are reached and, in particular, by noting who
successfully initiates or vetoes proposals. This technique comes closer than either of the
other two to capturing the realities of power as defined.
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Critics, however, have discovered several significant flaws. First, as a practical matter,
only a few important decisions can be studied in detail, and analyst must infer the broader
structure of power from his sample of cases (Dreyer: 1989: 9). Yet, controlling what is
placed on the agenda for decision is itself clearly an exercise of political power. If the
powerful are able to keep certain controversies off the agenda, their power is harder to
detect by the decisional method (Putnam: 1976:17).
Because none of these methods for finding the powerful is without defects, some analysts
have merged several different approaches. But in the case of the problem that this
assignment is investigating the secondary data analysis is being done on data gathered by
the positional approach. The elites or opinion-leaders are identified according to the
positions they occupy in the different sectors of society. The focus is in particular on those
elites that indicated that they support the ANC. Therefore, in the next chapter, this
assignment will present the attitude of the elite supporting the ANC on the economic policy
issues.
2.3 Nationalization
2.3.1 Brief History of Nationalization
Coleman (1991 :1-2) states that: "Politicians of all shades have advocated nationalization -
communists, socialists, social-democrats, liberals, conservatives, fascists. Stalin
nationalized, and so did Mussolini, Attlee, Roosevelt, and Edward Heath. Nationalization
has meant different things to different people. One man's confiscation, it has been found,
is another man's redistribution".
Some scholars like Hanson (1963:23), argued that nationalization is often treated as an
end, indeed, more or less identical with socialism, because it has been regarded not as a
means to achieve the ideals of socialism but as the only possible means which could not
fail to produce the desired ends.
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Coleman (1991 :8) agrees with Hanson, that nationalization, public ownership and state
intervention may be necessary means for socialist ends but, it becomes clear, such means
may also be employed for capitalist ends.
2.3.2 Definition of Nationalization
Nationalization refers to a process of take over of industries by the state that were
previously under private enterprise; it is done on a compulsory basis. Though the owners
of an undertaking may well be reluctant to see it taken over by the state for various
reasons, they sometimes receive some compensation, mere expropriation does not
always occur, but it happens. In other words nationalization may be defined as
government take-over of the ownership and operation of an industry or business
previously in the hands of private citizens, with or without the consent of the former owners
and with or without fair compensation (Schroenn: 1993:559).
Nationalization of "commanding heights" is the term introduced in 1945 by the British
Labour Party. It developed criteria to assess which companies fell within the ambit for
possible nationalization. Initially this approach identified key companies in the most
important sectors of the economy. Usually, the commanding heights were occupied by one
sector of the large companies, which could, by virtue of the strategic position, influence the
entire economy and its redistribution patterns (Coleman: 1991 :27).
An important purpose of nationalization is to ensure that services, on which general
welfare depends, shall be provided with the single objective, under authorities accountable
for their proceedings to the public (Pryke: 1971:3). Its success depends, therefore not on
mere change of ownership, but on the degree to which private enterprise was unable or
unwilling to undertake, and to enlist the active co-operation of employees increasing
production (Pryke: 1971 :45).
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According to Davies (1987: 86), the term "nationalization" has been used to describe such
diverse situations as that where a state:
• Takes a minority shareholding in an enterprise (usually termed partial
nationalization);
• Takes a majority shareholding, but leaves managerial control in the hands of the
private minority shareholder (s);
• Takes over, with or without compensation, 100% ownership of an enterprise but
enters into a management contract handing over management to private capital;
• Takes over the management of an enterprise, which continues to have a minority or
majority private shareholding.
• Takes over, with or without compensation, both 100% ownership and management
of an enterprise.
Peston (1980:68), argued that the heterogeneity of experience suggests that there have
been many reasons for nationalization, and that some of them may be peculiar to the
countries in question, and to some are motivated by mere fulfillment of explicit political
programme, to some a clear commitment to economic restructuring and planning.
2.3.3. Rationale behind ANC's Nationalization Programme
In South Africa the aims of nationalization appear to coincide with those encountered in
semi-industrialized countries. Evidence is drawn largely from the debates in South Africa.
Ideological consideration has been important in the analysis of the ANC objectives for
nationalization. This point has been discussed in the previous section, but it needs to be
revisited. Socialist ideology enters the debate through the ANC's links with the SACP (Le
Roux: 1992: 224).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
16
Although the ANC justified its nationalization proposals on social and economic grounds,
the SACP objectives, couched in terms of classical Marxism/Leninism were to end the
system of capitalist exploitation in South Africa and establish a democratic socialist society
based on the common ownership of and participation in and control by producers of the
key means of production (Schroenn: 1993:560). The SACP's understanding of democratic
socialism was that the greater part of the economy must be placed under public ownership
and control. This ownership and control had to be designed to progressively change the
relations of production and distribution with the objective of eventually eliminating all
economic exploitation (SACP, 1991b: 14 in Schroenn:1993:560).
Here is the summary of the reasons for nationalization as they are discussed in the
literature (see Schroenn, 1992, 1993; Roussos, 1990 and others that are cited in the
summary):
Strategic and market failure: Small or weak national private sectors have also given rise
to the establishment of public enterprises in areas perceived as strategic, such as
communication, transport and certain branches of heavy industry, where private sector
initiatives would not be forthcoming. The establishment of public enterprises in these
cases is a response to failures of the market mechanism; nationalization has been used in
efforts to improve efficiency (see Schroenn, 1992 and 1993). In South Africa, similar
arguments center on the provision or extension of basic services and infrastructure.
Nationalization calls made on these grounds may be seen as a response to the state's
privatization initiatives.
The calls for state intervention in 1992 were not for the nationalization of the existing
private firms but for the state to halt the privatization of essential goods and services, and
have given rise to threats to renationalize any privatized parastatals (see Schroenn, 1992
and 1993). State control of 'strategic' industries is also put forward as an objective in
South Africa, although the means of identifying such industries have not been made clear.
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It is argued that where the balance of evidence suggests that it would be advantageous to
have public corporations operating in these areas, these would be established by voluntary
or (more rarely) compulsory state purchase of existing enterprise or the creation of new
public enterprise (see ANC Department of Economic Policy: 1990:14). Gold has been
suggested as an example of a strategic industry 'too sensitive to be left in private hands',
because of its crucial role of foreign exchange earnings (see Roussos: 1990:53).
Increasing savings and investment: According to the ANC, nationalization of key
sectors would facilitate the planned channeling of investment, to direct growth of the
economy into areas 'beneficial to the entire community' (Rouses, 1990: 53). In addition to
this argument, Schroenn (1993: 561) argues that it is essential to recognize the immense
symbolic value of calls for nationalization here. He continued by stating "the concept of
nationalization represents a solution for an array of problems and frustrations for
economically disadvantaged people within the ANC's constituency. Nationalization in a
black-controlled, democratic South Africa is seen as making some amends for past
economic injustices while serving as a guarantee against similar injustices in the future".
Redistribution of wealth: To many leaders of the ANC nationalization was viewed as a
means to redistribute wealth. This belief has been stated repeatedly by prominent ANC
leaders and in particular Nelson Mandela (Schlemmer: 1990: 17).
Employment creation: To some in the ANC, nationalization was viewed as a tool to
create employment opportunities for the hundreds of thousands of people within the black
community.
According to Schlemmer (1990: 17) "the control over employment policy which
nationalization would afford the state, would facilitate the implementation of affirmative
action programmes to remedy the gross under-representation of black senior
management" .
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Reducing the concentration of economic power: The concentration of the economic
power to the white minority has always been a concern of the ANC, since its formation. In
South Africa, nationalization has also been seen as a means of reducing the concentration
(monopoly) of economic power (Schroenn: 1993:562).
Coleman (1991 :19) studied what the main reasons were behind a proposed nationalization
policy by the ANC leaders in the early 1990s. The following table is the summary of the
findings. The first column indicates the reason for nationalization; while column two is the
response and the last column represents the, i.e. the ANC and its allies.
TABLE 1: A comparative analysis of the aims of nationalization in South Africa
Aims of nationalization Include Source
InSA
IDEOLOGICAL:
The new socialism
Mixed economic
Yes
Yes
SACP,COSATU
ANC,
POLITICAL:
Industrial democracy SACP, COSATU
ANC,
Yes
Shifting decision making to a Yes
group responsible to the
public Yes
To achieve national self-
determ ination
ECONOMICS:
Redistribution of wealth Yes
(incomes)
Redistribution of wealth Yes
(services)
Correcting the failures of the Yes
market
ANC,COSATU,SACP
ANC, COSATU, SACP
ANC
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Filling investment gap Yes ANC,COSATU
Preserving and creating Yes ANC,COSATU
employment
Increasing productivity Yes COSATU
Changing employment Yes COSATU
practices
To assist economic planning Yes ANC,COSATU
by the state
Stabilizing and macro- Yes ANC, COSATU, SACP,
economic objectives
Correcting racial imbalances Yes ANC, COSATU, SACP
Control over monopoly Yes ANC, COSATU, SACP
power
Re-nationalization Yes ANC, COSATU, SACP
Source: (Coleman: 1991 :19)
It can be seen that, the ANC and its alliance partners viewed nationalization as means to
correct past political, social and economic injustices (see Table 1). However, at an
ideological level the SACP and COSATU viewed nationalization as some form of new
socialism whilst for the ANC, nationalization had to occur within the framework of a mixed
economy.
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2.4. Privatization
2.4.1. The roots of Privatization
In the discourse around Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear), various analysts
confirmed that Gear with its stress on privatization is a neo-liberal policy measure (see
Lehurelere, 1997; and Bond 1999).2 According to Lehurelere (in Meyer 2000), the key
elements of neoliberalism are, "wage restraint, deregulation of labour market, lowering of
tariffs, introduction of constraints to weaken the trade union collective bargaining powers,
and privatization. Furthermore, an important element of neo-liberalism focuses on the role
of the state, wherein the state must not operate at a loss - it must not have a substantial
budget deficit. This implies, inter alia, extensive cuts on social expenditure".
In other words, privatisation emanates from the free market economic or capitalism theory
(Schlemmer: 1990:18). Private capitalism advocates that individuals take charge of the
means of production so that the state can have a lesser role to play in the economy
(Tangri: 1999:40). Feigenbaum et al (1998:3) argues that privatization leads to the
shrinking role of the state in the economy.
Like nationalization, privatization can be linked to an ideological agenda, as it was the
case in Great Britain, after the Conservative Party took over in the 1980s.
However, both Capitalist and Socialist political ideologies do privatize. A good example of
this point can be found in France, where even the Socialist governments in the latter part
of the century were willing to privatise public assets (Feigenbaum et al: 1998: 5). In
Tangri's (1999:41) words, "privatization is a policy instrument whose time has arrived, not
just in South Africa, but also in a global context.
2 Neoliberalism is an economic philosophy, with its roots in the free-market ideals of Adam Smith and popularized by
John Keynes during the 1930s (Martinez and Gracia: 1999:1).
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It is said that in both the East as well as in the Capitalist West, "privatisation is associated
with increased release of market forces as an antidote to the over-extension of state
economic intervention and expenditure". With brief history and theoretical underpinnings of
privatization outlined, it appears appropriate to delve into its definition and that will be
carried out in the part hereunder.
2.4.2 Definition of Privatization
Leach and Vorhies (in Vorhies: 1990:23) argued that privatisation per se involves the sale
or transfer of state assets to the private sector. In other words, privatization involves the
selling-off of state-owned assets to private sector or the withdrawal of the state from
certain areas of economic activity to allow the private sector to take them over. A typical
example might be the selling of shares in a state-owned company, or the company as a
whole, or the ending of state provision of services such as education, health, cleaning and
catering (Fine: 1998: 1).
The capital that will be acquired as the result of privatisation will be used in reducing the
cost of the government debt, encourage direct foreign investment, broadening ownership
within the economy, encourage black empowerment, and improving productivity and
efficiency of vital services such as communication and transportation (Ginsberg:
1998:220). The definition of privatisation leads us to the rationale behind it, and it is
discussed in the following paragraph.
2.4.3. Reasons for Privatization
According to Leach and Vorhies (in Vorhies: 1990:23), the main reason that governments
around the world are privati sing is to raise revenue. An example of this has been the
privatization of Iscor in South Africa in the late 1980s. This gave a large boost to the
economy.
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A state can profit from privatization in at least three ways: (reference?)
• It can collect proceeds from the sale of state-owned firm
• By turning a losing government firm into a profiting private firm, it can eliminate
subsidies; and
• It can tax the privatized firm and any new entrants into deregulated industry.
Privatization, by bringing about a more-efficient use of resources, promotes economic
growth and development.
At ideological level, the supposedly beneficial forces of the market and individual
incentives are set against the presumed corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy of the state
(Fine: 1994:23).
Privatization depoliticises managerial decision-making. In state monopolies, management
gets its authority from the state - so it must do what the state wants, not what its
customers want. In conclusion, the motivation for privatisation is that it leads to the
reduction of costs, improved delivery, a stimulus to private sector, and better managerial
practices associated with private corporations (Vorhies: 1990: 22).
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2.5. From Nationalization to Privatization: A chronology of the ANC Shift in
Economic Policy in the 19905.
In tracing shifts in the ANC economic policy (from nationalization to privatization) since
1990, this assignment outlines theoretical underpinnings and indicates political dimensions
of policy formulation where appropriate.
Of course, this is not only a matter of reporting; it is not enough to merely point out shifts.
It is imperative to analyze the changes in ANC policy and to establish their substantive
content. Instead of presenting a simple chronological exposition (1990-2000), changes in
the ANC nationalization policy will be considered in terms of five broad themes namely:
• The Freedom Charter: ANC position prior 1990;
• The process of policy shift (1990 to 1994);
• Privatization policy of the ANC (1994-1996);
• The extent of privatization policy;
• The reaction to privatization policy in the post-apartheid era.
The intention of such analysis is not simply to demonstrate the extent and the nature of
policy reformulation. Analyzing the nature of the changes also establishes a specific
question regarding the shifts (for example: What role did the elite supporting the ANC play
in the party's change of heart on economic policy?). Before one begins to analyze the ANC
policy shifts, it is important to stress two related points.
• Firstly, the changes in ANC policy were not linear and uni-directional. Although
there was a clear trend in the direction of policy changes (which this chapter aims to
expose), it did not develop in a simple, unproblematic and consistent manner. It was
not uncommon, especially in the press, for individuals in the ANC to adopt
significantly different positions on the question of nationalization or, for that matter,
a single individual to adopt different, conflicting positions over a period of time -
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sometimes softening their positions, but at other times backtracking to a harder
position.
• Secondly, the shift in policy did not happen overnight. Its development was a
complex process, impacted on by variety of factors (Ceruti: 1996:12).
2.5.1 Freedom Charter: ANC position pre-1990
Although the focus of this chapter is the period from 1990 to 2000, it is useful to briefly
consider the clause of the Freedom Charter (adopted by the Congress of the People on 26
June 1955), which many accept as the ANC's earliest statement on nationalization. The
word nationalization is not actually used in the Charter document, but the sentence, " The
mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and the monopoly industry shall be transferred
to the ownership of the people as a whole ..." is generally being interpreted by Charterists
as referring to it (see Davies: 1987:85). For example, McMenamin (1992:246) argued that
the economic clause of the Freedom Charter has been interpreted as meaning that the
liberation movement advocates a mixed economy in which there is an active role for the
state to confront the legacy of apartheid.
According to Liebenberg (1994:15) The Freedom Charter clause on the economy
"unleashed an ideological and semantic controversy". In an attempt to deal with this
ideological controversy, Pallo Jordan (then ANC information officer), argued that "there are
two trends with regard to nationalization: one is the socialist/communist trend, which sees
nationalization as policy. The other is the ANC's - nationalization is a form of
redistribution ...so the first is ideological, the second is concerned with how we
redistribute ...therefore the nationalist trend would look to other means since nationalization
is merely a means to an end" (Interview, 1993 see Ceruti, 1996).
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Nevertheless, for the purpose of this assignment, what is important about the clause is that
for the ANC elites it is certainly a call for nationalization of central industries or the
commanding heights of the economy.
While nationalization, either as a policy or a means, employed to obtain redistributive
objectives, implies to a greater extent state involvement in the economy, privatization
implies mainly the erosion of such a role in the economy. Given the centrality of ANC elites
views on policy options such as nationalization and privatization on this assignment,
nationalization as redistributive means or policy options becomes a focal point of analysis.
However, according to Boraine (quoted in Liebenberg: 1990:13) the Freedom Charter is
not a "socialist document, it suggests a democratic demand for an abolishment to
exclusive control of the country's economy by monopoly capital, both national and
international". During the greater part of the liberation struggle, enquirers of the economic
policy were referred to the Freedom Charter. According to Maslam (in Liebenberg:
1994:15), the Charter was an attempt at ideological reconciliation. It tried to link liberal,
non-racial capitalism with socialist orientation. This vagueness left the charter open to wide
interpretation, but it did have the advantage that, as a conciliatory document, it could
mobilize support over a broad spectrum (Adam and Moodely: 1986:95-96). McKinley
(1997:xi) argues that the ideological orientation of the ANC has followed a pattern of what
can be called incorporation. This represents strategic ideological choices on the part of the
ANC rather than undulating and self-propelled tactical terrain (McKinely: 1997: 1).
The Charter did not identify the extent of monopolization of the economy nor did it discuss
the implications of transferring to public ownership. According to Davies (1987:85)
"transferring the ownership of the monopolies to the people is sometimes regarded as
equivalent to a call for nationalization. However, nationalization is in itself only a change in
the legal property. More precisely it is a transfer of legal property rights to a state.
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As such, a variety of forms, occur under different forms of state, and in the context of
several possible patterns of social relations of production".
Though the ANC could be characterized as a progressive movement, nationalization has
been interpreted differently by its elites. To some, nationalization was the means to an
end, to others it was the end itself (see Jordaan, in Ceruit 1996).
2. 5.2 The shift from nationalization to privatization (1990-1994)
The uncompromising ANC stance on nationalization in the early 1990s opened up great
economic policy debate not only within the ANC circles but also to a broader South African
society. In the period from 1990 to 1994, the ANC economic policy shifted away from
nationalization. In 1990, the ANC leadership proposed a compromising stance on the
issue of nationalisation. For example Sisulu proposed the dismemberment of key
corporations and the diffusion of power in industries. In June, Joe Slovo argued that it was
"time to abandon the old clinch of nationalization" (although in August the same year, he
said that nationalization of some industry and financial concerns was certain); in October
1990, Mbeki said: "nationalization is not essential; it was never part of the ANC policy",
adding that the ANC had "dumped" nationalization as an essential part of economic
restructuring (Ceruti: 1996:19).
At the end of 1990, the first changes in nationalization policy appeared in the ANC
documents. The Economic Policy Discussion Document maintained that the ANC would
only nationalize "whatever is strategic", suggesting welfare services, housing and health as
likely sectors. But it did not mention banks and monopolies that were previously mentioned
by ANC elites.
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The draft economic manifesto (DEM; published as the Draft Resolution on ANC Economic
Policy, May 1991) continued to argue for "an efficient public sector", specifying that such a
public sector was necessary to "orientate production to meet basic needs" (see Mayibuye,
1991).
The Discussion Document of the Department of Economic Policy sparked off intense
debate in the ANC. Three main contesting parties as identified by Nattrass (1994:350)
were the moderate national leadership supported by most economists in the ANC; more
grassroots oriented activists; and trade unionists. Nattrass (1994:350) stated that the
moderate national leaders were acutely aware of the need to compromise on economic
policy and to start bringing about the conditions necessary to restore growth by mollifying
potential investors. International pressure on these leaders to drop any apparent lingering
attachments to nationalization or to socialism accentuated this. Over the course of 1991,
the ANC national leadership started projecting more moderate, business-friendly policies
(Nattrass: 1994:350-1).
Grassroots activists, who for years had mobilized support for the SACP, the United
Democratic Front and ANC on the basis of the Freedom Charter, were unhappy with this
process. These militant populists felt uneasy about the demise of radical rhetoric and
deeply skeptical about the conventional technical economic explanations. Disturbed by the
ANC's top-down approach to negotiations and policy formulation, they demanded greater
democratic accountability (see Lodge: 1999 and Nattrass: 1994).
The perceived shift triggered angry reaction within the ANC's constituencies and
COSATU. At the May 1992 ANC Conference they pushed privatization off the agenda. The
Policy Guidelines ("Ready to Govern"; May 1992), which were adopted at the ANC's
national conference, manifested similar tensions.
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On one hand, there was an apparent recommitment to (limited) nationalization: "the
document stated that the democratic state would have primary responsibility for the
provision of welfare and infrastructure, and went on to say that this state: will therefore
consider: increasing the public sector in strategic areas through, for example,
nationalization, purchasing a shareholding in companies, establishing new public
corporations, or joint ventures with the private sector ..."(Lodge: 1992:10).
According to Nattrass (1994:353), the gist of the post-1990 retreats were endorsed, thanks
partly to the presence of Mandela, Sisulu and Rarnaphosa'' in the economic policy debate
at the conference. However, McMenamin (1992:252) asserted that ANC economic
thinking came to reflect a "shift away from policies which may be morally and politically
correct, but which will cause strong adverse reaction from powerful local and international
interests" .
Nationalization was severely criticized by the media. According to (Marais: 1998:149)
criticisms varied from 'socialist' perspectives to a more sophisticated set of objections to
macro-economic capitalist debates. It is difficult to pinpoint factors that led to the ANC
elites shift from nationalization to privatization. But, as Bond (2000:17) has suggested,
"the plethora of corporate scenario planning exercise unleashed after 1990 had a telling
impact".
The first corporate scenario planning was Nedcor/Old Mutual's Platform for Successful
Transition, launched in late 1990 and completed in 1993. This was followed by San lam's
Platform for Investment Scenarios. Meanwhile, other documents, like the South African
Chamber of Business's (SACOB) Economic Options for South Africa documents were
also presented to the ANC leadership in the mid 1990s (Marais: 1998:150).
3 Mandela, Sisulu and Ramaphosa were all members of the ANC National Executive Committee and National Working
Committee and they were also President, Deputy President and Secretary General of the ANC respectively.
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In Bond's (2000:15) view, "the scenario exercises reflected the desire of the masters and
carefully handpicked participants to come up with a deal rather than with good analysis.
Understanding that the process was a set of elementary truisms notably the need for
macroeconomic stringency, restraint in efforts at social restructuring, an outward oriented
economy and a facilitating (as opposed to regulating) state".
According to Marais (1998:50), when analyzing the corporate scenario planning it is
equally important to analyze the form of the exercises and the activities that accompanied
the process of scenario exercises that the ANC elites were engaged in with the business
leaders. The workshops were in the form of " books, videos, multi-media presentations,
and newspaper supplements". Their impact was guaranteed by "seminars, conferences,
workshops, briefings, international fact-finding trips and high-profile visits by carefully
chosen foreign experts - financed by business and foreign development agencies". The
ANC was severely attacked by the media when any of their leaders were heard
mentioning anything close to nationalization policies.
To take this point further, the ANC was perceived, by many, as having a "left wing
pedigree" run by activists rather used to planning how to bring down power cables than
holding down inflation (Scheidman: 1990:10). More specifically, the business world's fears
were that like so many African governments it would attempt to run the economy by
promoting the public sector jobs whilst destroying private sector ones with protection and
labour regulation. Therefore, the merest hint to nationalization during the ANC's election
campaign sent business into a frenzy (Ajulu, 1993). For example, De Beers announced
that it was relocating a substantial portion of its diamond operations to Switzerland
immediately after Mandela announced that he was still in favour of nationalization of the
mines.
This caused a radical rethink by the ANC, As Herbst (1994: 159), puts it, the ANC leaders
then "beat a hastily retreat" and the Congress began a difficult rethinking of policy, which
resulted in the subsequent rejection of nationalization as a viable option.
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This was confirmed by Mandela's speech to the United Nations in 1994, which clearly
expressed pro-business views, he confirmed to the Confederation of British Industry that
the ANC was committed to a generally free-market economy. In an address to South
African Business community the following month, he declared that in order to avoid losing
overseas investment the ANC would be abandoning its ideological commitment to
"nationalization" of the mines and banks (Murray: 1994:10).
As a consequence, the twin objectives of restoring business confidence and attracting
foreign investment seemed now to dominate. Most significantly, the ANC seemed to
accept that the sums in the ROP would not add up; well at least not without substantial
injection of money from the outside institutions like the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank. All the above factors led to the adoption of privatization as the policy of
the ANC.
2.5.2 Privatization Policy of the ANC (1994-1996)
Michie and Padayachee (1997:21) argued that the ANC, which had long objected to
privatization appeared to be convinced that privatization might deliver major benefits
including the use of proceeds generated from the process to fund the ROP. This happened
despite of continuing objections from its alliance partners. According to Brynard (1995:35)
the ANC government needed to improve the quality of life of South Africans, particularly
the disadvantaged and it viewed privatization as an instrument for funding the ROP. For
privatization purposes the emphasis falls on the reprioritization of the expenditure for the
ROP and the fundamental restructuring of the public service.
Reprioritization includes a redeployment of personnel and resources that will increase the
overall efficiency of the public sector. Government departments were asked to cut their
budget by four per cent to fund an initial allocation of R2, 5 billion to the ROP in 1994.
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The South African government was considering full and partial privatization of state assets.
Funds obtained from the selling of state assets would be used to reduce debt and to
support the ROP. The government would invest the income from privatization in such a
way that the physical results of these investments would be seen for example in schools
and medical clinics. This would provide the government with a legitimate base for
implementing its ROP (Meyer: 1997:71).
The former Minister for Public Enterprises, Ms SN Sigcau, mentioned six enterprises in
Parliament (on the 14 June 1997) that could be privatized, namely Eskom, Transnet,
Alexcor (Government diamond mine), Aventura (a chain of holiday resorts), Safcol (South
African Forestry Company Limited), and Denel (Commercial branch of the Armament
Corporation of South Africa). She also said that the government was careful with the
privatization of state assets to ensure that the population will benefit from these sales. She
said that the government is interested in methods where power could be transferred to the
survivors of apartheid through the process of privatization (Coetzee, 1997:43). Power
distribution among workers and the generation of funds are two of the most important
requirements for privatization (Coetzee, 1997:43).
On 31 October 1994, Mbeki outlined the South African government's policy on privatization
in Parliament. He said that part of the process should involve looking at what assets the
government has, and whether they are contributing to the process of achieving the ROP
goals. The assets vary greatly from tea plantations to nuclear power stations. First, the
government would like to have a comprehensive audit of the value of parastatals (Meyer,
1997:72).
This implies that the government needs to find out exactly what assets it has and whether
those assets are candidates for successful privatization. If those assets are privatized,
funds will be used for the ROP (Meyer: 1997:71).
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From the above discussion, it is evident that the privatization process was a top-down
approach, meaning it was driven by the elites. According to Shabalala" (1998: 17), "the
programme for privatizing State Owned Enterprise was not derived from the transformation
of the totality represented by the South African economy; let alone the political economy.
No legislated instrument has been prepared and promulgated both as a means of
encouraging debate and of allowing public (voters) representatives in Parliament to
participate in the conceptualization and concretization of the programme. The programme
has been driven largely by sector ministers as well as a sub-committee of the Cabinet,
known as the Inter-Ministerial Cabinet Committee". The reason for that probably was the
fear that the public, of which the majority is the black working class, may successfully
reject privatization.
2.5.3 The extent of privatization
After the government had endorsed privatization in the macro-economic strategy (i.e. Gear
in 1996), it had to be implemented. Although the new government had committed itself to
privatization, not much in this direction actually occurred, except for the partial sales of
30% in the state telecommunications parastatal, Telkom (still a monopoly), to Malaysian
Company and the South-western Bell Communications (USA) on the 14 March 1997. The
government also promised to consider the possibility of offering shares in Telkom to the
general public and that it could be listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange within five
years.
4 Professor Sipho Shabalala is a Special Advisor in the KwaZulu-Natal Premier's office. He was formerly Deputy
Director-General in the Department of Public Enterprise.
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Government will soon offer 10% of its shares in Telkom to black investors through the
envisaged National Empowerment Fund (providing easier access to credit for taking up the
shares). This leaves 60% of the shares that could potentially be offered to the public (Du
Pisanie: 1997:17).
Secondly the partial sale of South African Airways to Swiss Air took place in the following
year. The sale of SABC radio stations and the partial privatization of Telkom gave the
process a solid start, but since then only four privatization deals have gone through, three
of which are relatively minor: Aeroporti Ci Roma has bought a stake in the Airports
Company, and Sun Air, Aventura (since delayed) Denel's Sybase have been sold to local
buyers and a stake in the South African Airways to Swiss Air OCDE: (1999:90). Table 2:
provides the summary of the extent of privatization from 1996 to 1998.
Table 2: Selection of Privatization deals from 1996 to 1998
YEAR COMPANY BUYER PRICE
1996 6 radio stations Various media R520 million
consortia
1996 Transkei Airways Liquidated N/A
1997 30% Telkom SBC R5, 6 billion
Communications,
Malaysian
Telkom
1997 Sun Air Rethabile-Comair R97 million (incl.
debt)
1998 20% Airport Co Aeroporti di R819 million
SA Roma
1998 Adventura COSATU led R93 million (incl
consortium debt)
1998 49% Sybase S.A. Elexir R38 million
Source: Sunday Times Busmess Times, July 1998, (Shabalala, 1998: 17)
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2. 5.5 Reaction to the privatization initiatives
Government's privatizations sparked-off outrage and emphatic denunciation from
groupings with leftist leanings and sparked simmering tensions within the ANC-SACP-
COSATU alliance. SACP and COSATU tended to adopt a similar stance in their reaction
to privatization. COSATU's reaction to privatization has assumed two different but
complimentary positions.
Firstly, COSATU rejected privatization from the position of the labour movement
concerned with the impact that privatization might have on its general membership in
terms of retrenchment and downsizing associated with restructuring. Secondly, COSATU
rejected privatization as a civil society organization and thus taking the government to task
on the policies the latter formulates.
However, analysts such as Meyer associated labour's opposition to privatization with the
legacy bequethed by the anti-Apartheid struggle- that of politicized and militant Labour
union, and as such "oppose restructuring from various assumptions and ideological
perspectives" (Meyer, 2000:15). Labour unions challenged every aspect of Apartheid
legislation whether such aspects related to labour or to the general public by employing
means such as strike action. But, what Meyer fails to note is that workers, whose interest
the labour federation represent, are part of civil society and thus affected by government
policy. And for that reason, like every citizen, have a right to voice their reservations in
respect of certain policies pursued by the government.
Political groupings at the centre and to the right of the South African political continuum,
such as Democratic Party (DP), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the National Party (NP),
were pro-privatization (Financial Mail, 18 August 1995). Organized business appeared to
be in general agreement with the GNU's privatization drive (SA Foundation, 1996) and
therefore, not surprisingly, disagreed vehemently with union privatization interests.
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In a press statement the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) reiterated its pro-
privatization stance, prompting government to: "... get on with privatization" (Business Day,
16 September 1996).
The Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) also supported the government's privatization drive.
The AHI asserted that" ... privatization must form part of an integrated and coherent
strategy to put the South African economy on the road to robust and coherent growth as
soon as possible" (The Star-Business Report, 26 March 1996).
2. 6. Conclusion
The discussion above depicts an eventful retreat from strong socialist principles embedded
in the Freedom Charter to a compromise mixed economy and growth through
redistribution and later Gear and privatization. It appears strange that privatization policy,
which was subject to extreme opposition by the ANC leaders and its present social and
political partners COSATU and SACP, during apartheid years is now actively pursued by
the ANC, even in the light of present opposition from its social partners.
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Chapter Three
Data Analysis and Discussion
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, this assignment discussed the economic policy evolution of the
ANC. It has concluded that the ANC has moved away from its nationalization rhetoric of
the early 1990s to concrete privatization policies (in Gear) of the late 1990s. Even though it
is clear that the ANC's economic policy has shifted, the transition process itself was not
simple and consistent. The ANC's alliance partners have, since the inception of Gear
opposed the economic shift, and specifically privatisation, the cornerstone of the new
economic course that was taken by government. As has been stated in the preceding
chapter, the author takes the centrality of elites in the policy-making process as his point of
departure. It therefore follows that a study of the positional attitude of elite supporters of
the ANC is crucial for a more complete understanding of the apparent turn of the ANC with
regard to economic policy.
It is the aim of this chapter to report on the attitudinal position on selected economic policy
issues of those members of the South African elite supporting the ANC. This chapter will
describe the attitudinal shift amongst ANC elite supporters on the economic policy issues,
such as nationalization and privatisation. This will be done by presenting and analysing
secondary empirical data collected from 1991 up until 2000 by the Centre for International
Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch.
Cameron (1993: 134) contends that, "public policy is the preferences and values of a
governing elite. The elite shape the mass opinion on policy questions more than masses
shape the opinion of the elite; policy therefore does not arise from mass demands".
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
37
This is why Van Wyk (1987: 65), justifiably states that decision-makers operate (or should
operate) on the assumption that "elite support expressed or tacit is a prerequisite for
successful policy".
If the above is transposed to the South African context, it can be argued that ANC elite
attitudes, beliefs and values may help us to describe the shifts in economic policy from
1990 up until 2000, and may also assist in predicting the policy actions that the
incumbents are most likely to adopt in the future. This means that their beliefs and
attitudes on nationalization and privatization might shed some light on whether the current
economic regime is a product of elite consensus over the past decade, and whether the
ANC political elite will adopt either of the mentioned economic policies or a fusion of the
two.
This chapter will consist of two sections. The first section will focus on the research
strategy that was used to gather the elite data, while the second section will look at the
results of our data analysis.
3.2. Research strategy
3.2.1. Criteria of selecting the elites and sectors
From 1991 to 2000 the Centre for International Comparative Politics (CICP) have
employed a positional sampling method, by means of which leaders in various socio-
economic and political institutions were selected as respondents. These institutions must
be deemed to be influential in the matters of public policy-making. Kotzé (1991 :7) states
that the primary criteria of the elite surveys are based on the following assumptions:
• "The sector must be regarded as an important sector by experts in terms of power
and influence it has in national affairs (for example bureaucracy, the business
sector); and
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• The sector is regarded as important if it fulfils some or other formal representative
function (for example, the political movements within and outside of parliamentary
politics, churches, trade unions, business organizations, media organizations)".
3.2.2 Sample size
The data that we have analysed for the purposes of this paper comes from the six elite
surveys that were conducted in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000 by the CICP.
The 1991 sample drawn from 1181 respondents, of which 51 (4.3%) identified themselves
as ANC supporters. In 1992, the number of the respondents decreased to 1113, while the
number of the ANC supporters increased to 75 (6.7%). In the third survey, which was
conducted in 1993, the respondents decreased considerably to only 471, while the elites
who regarded themselves as ANC supporters increased to 54 (11.5%). In 1995 the sample
increased to 635, and about 134 (21%) identified themselves as ANC supporters. In 1998,
the sample size decreased again to 476, with 186 (39%) ANC supporters. In 2000, the
elite size decreased to 387, of which about 207 (56%) were ANC supporters. (The
differences in the number of respondents are mainly due to the initial size of the sample
and the response rate, which varied between 36% and 48%, as these were all postal
surveys).
For obvious reasons, the ANC was not well represented in the survey samples of the early
1990s. Before 1994 the ANC was not represented in the most influential institutions in
South Africa, due to its opposition to the apartheid policies of the National Party
government. However, from mid to late 1990s ANC elite supporters were better
represented.
This is the direct result of the black representation in the government and in the private
sector since 1994. The ANC supporters were now in prominent positions that were
regarded as powerful and influential in the country.
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3.2.3 Data Analysis Procedure
In this section, the author will discuss the findings of this investigation. Therefore, this
section will consist of the following sub-sections:
• Attitudinal position of the ANC elites on what should be the role of the state in the
South African economy.
• Analysis of the available data
3.2.3.1 Attitudinal position of the ANC elites on what should be the role of the state
in the economy.
The first issue that will be addressed is the position of elite supporters of the ANC on the
role that the state should play in the economy. In as far as the economic policy was
concerned, the debate centered on the preferences for socialism (state controlled
economic system) or capitalism (free market economic system). Respondents were asked
to indicate their attitude to this variable on a 1 (strong state intervention in the economy) to
100 (completely free market economy) point scale. The question put to respondents was
as follows: ''There are different views on the role of the state regarding the economy. An
important aspect is the extent to which the state in a new constitutional dispensation
should be allowed to control the economy. Views on this vary from those, which indicate
total control of the economy to complete free market. Please indicate your opinion by
marking the scale accordingly". This variable is coded in units of 1O.We have recorded it
into five categories, of which 1 represents "a strong state controlled economy", 2
represents "a moderately state controlled economy", 3 represents a "mixed economy", 4 "a
moderately free market economy", and 5 a "completely free market economy".
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An analysis of the data at hand appears to point to consistently strong support for a mixed
economic system over the past ten years (See Table 3).
Another significant observation is that the number of the ANC elite supporters who support
a state-controlled economy is below 20% in all the surveys. Albeit slow, support for a free
market economy, on the other hand, has consistently been increasing over the measured
period.
Table: 3 Support on an economic spectrum of elites supporting the ANC, 1991 to 2000.
Years Strong Moderate Mixed Moderate free Complete free
state state economy market market economy
economy controlled economy
economy
1991 20% 61% 10% 8%
1992 16% 57% 13% 10%
1993 20% 41% 24% 13%
1995 16.5% 57% 16% 11%
1998 14 % 47% 14% 12%
2000 3% 17% 53% 23% 4%
From 1995 onwards Cosatu members were included in the survey which may have shifted
the pattern more towards the "state control" of the spectrum. This support for "a mixed
economy" came as a surprise to many people who thought that the ANC would opt to use
political power to facilitate the distribution of resources in favour of Blacks, its larger
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constituency of voters. This expectation was created by ANC leaders in the early 1990s,
which publicly advocated state control, nationalization of industries, and the redistribution
of wealth on various levels (Kotzé, 1992:71). However, the results are showing a different
picture of the attitudes and beliefs of the ANC elites on economic policy issues.
This is consistent with Kotzé's (1993:70) observations and description of the ANC elite
shift from their strong state advocacy for state-controlled economy. He argued that the
consistent low number of those who support a state-controlled economy within the ANC
elite, signify a shift. So, the shift that Kotzé noted is from the left to the centre, because the
majority of the ANC elites preferred a mixed economy to other options.
This shift from the left to the centre can most probably be attributed to the impact of
meetings and workshops that were conducted by the private sector organizations, and by
the International financial institutions whereby ANC elites were invited to participate. Kotzé
(1992:69) also acknowledges this point, when he argued that economic policy issues were
mostly often discussed in a "political inclusive way at conferences, scenario discussions,
workshops and indabas". For example, the corporate scenario planning by Nedcor/Old
Mutual's Platform for Successful Transition, Sanlam's Platform for Investment Scenario,
and the South African Chamber of Business's Economic Options for South Africa (Marais,
1998:150). These various economic forums that have already been created on national
(for example National Economic Forum) and regional level served as a useful function in
this regard. Therefore, these activities made it possible for many elites in the ranks of the
ANC to change their views on economic policy issues.
3.2.3.2 Attitudinal position of the ANC on Gear (macro-economic strategy)
This section attempts to assess the level of support, which the ANC elites offer to its
macro-economic policy framework, Growth Employment and Redistribution strategy. As it
has been mentioned earlier on, Gear was adopted in June 1996, and was declared non-
negotiable by the Minister of Finance Mr. Trevor Manuel (OCDE: 1999:103).
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Its core component is the sale of non-strategic assets and the creation of private public
partnerships (PPP's). Gear as a macro-economic policy framework has its own target
projections that have been set, and they are the following:
• GOP growth of 6% by the year 2000;
• Accelerated employment growth, reaching 409, 000 jobs annually after the year
2000 and reversing the arch of unemployment;
• An inflation rate below the 10% barrier throughout the period;
• Average annual real non-gold export growth of 8.4% during the five year period;
• A rise in gross domestic savings, from 18% to 22% of GOP;
• Increase gross domestic investment, from 20% to 22% of GOP in the year 2000
with an average annual real private investment growth of 11.7%;
• Inflows of foreign investment equivalent to almost 4% of GOP (Adelzadeh: 1999: 3).
It becomes important for studies like these to find out whether the elite supporting the
ruling party (ANC) gave its consent to this, essentially neo-liberal, macro-economic policy.
Because Gear was introduced in 1996, support for it, has only been measured in the 1998
and 2000 surveys. The following questions pertaining to Gear were included in both
surveys:
• The lowering of tariffs on imported goods should be done more rapidly
• Increases in wages and salaries must be limited
• The labour market must be more flexible
• The budget deficit must be reduced
• The government sector employment should be limited
• Exchange controls should be done away with.
The above questions were, furthermore, employed to create a "Gear Index" which can be
used as a composite measure to fathom the extent to which ANC elite supporters acceded
to the organization's liberal economic paradigm of the late 1990's.
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For the original questions five response categories (Strongly agree, Agree, Neither agree
nor disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree) were offered to respondents. In the following
paragraphs we report the first and last two categories respectively as combined entities.
Both the 1998 and 2000 indices recorded high reliability scores. The respective
Cronbach's Alpha scores - a reliability measure for index construction - were .7448 (1998)
and .7468 (2000). An Alpha of .7 is in most instances an "acceptable" reliability score
(George and Mallory, 2000:279).
For the 1998 index the results as reflected in Table 4 below were obtained. The Gear
policy points of departure received an overwhelming support from the ANC elites, for
instance about 75 percent of the ANC elite supported the Gear policy framework. In
contrast to Cosatu's only 8.2 percent that supported Gear strategy. Only 5.1 percent of the
ANC were uncertain, compared to 20.4 percent of Cosatu's elites. While 72 percent of
Cosatu elites were opposed to Gear compared to only 8.7 percent of the ANC elites.
If one looks at the 2000 results in the Table 3, one would notice that there is a huge drop
of support for Gear in the ANC elites from 75.3 in 1998 to 47.9 percent. Another interesting
development that needs to be mentioned is an increase of the indecisive ANC elites from
5.1 in 1998 to 42.1percent in 2000. In contrast with the 1998 results, the 2000 results point
to a decrease in support for Gear amongst ANC elites. Only a slight increase in the
number of the ANC elites that are opposed to Gear is noticeable, from 8.7 percent in 1998
to almost 10 percent in 2000.
However, when comparing the ANC and Cosatu elites, one will still find that the ANC is
pro-Gear and Cosatu is anti-Gear. Even Cosatu is not consistent in its opposition to Gear.
For example, 72 percent of Cosatu elites that were opposed to Gear decreased to 58.5
percent in 2000 (It should be mentioned, however, that the N's are relatively small, N=49 in
1998 and N=42 in 2000). In this research assignment N is the total number of the elites
from various groups within the ANC that participated in the survey.
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Those that were uncertain decreased from 16 percent in 1998 to 12 percent in 2000
survey. Like the ANC, Cosatu's indecisive elites increased from 20.4 percent in 1998 to
34.1 percent in 2000. Lastly there is a slight noticeable decrease in the number of
Cosatu's elites who supported Gear in 2000, from 8.2 percent in 1998 to 7.3 in 2000.
Table 4: A comparison of Support for Gear between the ANC and Cosatu
Support ANC elites - ANCelites- COSATU elites - COSATU
1998 2000 1998 elites - 2000
Strongly Support 7.2% 2.9% 0.0% 2.4%
Support 68.1% 45.0% 8.2% 4.9%
Neither 5.1% 42.1% 20.4% 34.1%
Do not Support 6.5% 9.9% 55.1% 43.9%
Strongly do not 2.2% 0.0% 16.3% 14.6%
Support
N (numbers) = 131 183 49 42
A possible explanation on why there is a relatively large decrease in Gear support in 2000
survey may be that, Gear was still in its inception phase in 1998, and many amongst the
elite were merely hoping for positive results.
As it has become evident, Gear has not lived up to its initial projections of economic
growth. This may have contributed to the disillusionment among ANC elites supporters
with regard to Gear.
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Adelzadeh (1999:2) provides evidence that shows that the Gear framework has failed to
yield the expected outcomes in key issues of the economy. He forwards the following
points as illustration of Gear's apparent failure:
• "Instead of economic growth, there has been a slow down in economic growth since
1996 from 3.2% to 1.7% in 1997 and down to 0.1% in 1998. Negative growth
occurred during the first two quarters of 1998 (-2.5% and -0.3%), placing the
economy officially in recession;
• Instead of increased employment, there were massive job losses. The expected
employment in the formal non-agricultural sectors of the economy never
materialised. For example, the employment growth plunged deeper from -0.7% in
1996 to -1.7% in 1997;
• Instead of increased private sector investment, there had been a steep drop.
Private sector investment has fallen sharply since 1996. For example the 6.1%
growth rate in private investment that was recorded in 1996 dropped to 3.1% in
1997 and plunged to negative growth of -0.7% in 1998. Overall, the sector's share
of total fixed investment has fallen from 73% to 68% since 1996;
• Instead of lower government expenditure on debt, there has been an increase in
debt since 1994 and 1995 respectively from 48.2% and 54.9%. Government debt
as a percentage of GDP in 1996 was 56.2%, in 1997 the figure stood at 55.8%, and
in 1998 dropped to 55.4%;
• Instead of stable current account deficit, it became worsened. The current account
deficit worsened from -1.3% in 1996 to -2.1% in 1998. In this period, the current
account deficit has deteriorated by 83%, soaring from -R7, 292m to -R13, 466m"
(Adelzadeh, 1999:2).
• The National Treasury projected GDP growth at only 2.4% in 2000 (South African
Surveys, 2000/2001).
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3.2.3.3 Attitudinal position of the elite supporting the ANC on Privatization Policy
Privatization has probably been the most controversial aspect of Gear opposed by most
trade unions, especially those that are in alliance with the ANC. Since it is also the focus of
this assignment, it is worth asking whether the ANC elite supporters really have shifted
away from nationalization to privatization. Does the fact that the ANC-led government has
slowly continued to implement privatization of state assets signify the shift? Or did the fact
that the ANC has not fully embraced privatization signify otherwise?
Both questions are useful too for analysing the ANC economic shift, and to a greater
extent signify the shift. However, one cannot underestimate the importance of their
attitudes and beliefs on this controversial policy of privatization. As it has been mentioned
in the previous chapters, elite attitudes and beliefs may shed some light on the future
policy dynamics of the country. One factor that makes this assignment interesting is the
fact that in almost all instances privatization ventures were strongly opposed by the ANC's
alliance partners. In this section, the author attempts to establish whether the elites
supporting the ANC readily acceded to privatization components of Gear or not.
Privatization although it has been called by another name - restructuring -became a clear
government policy after Gear was publicly announced as government's official macro-
economic framework in 1996. This means that it is only in the 1998 and 2000 surveys
where privatization can be assessed. In this section, the author will analyse privatization
only in terms of the above-mentioned surveys.
For the purposes of this analysis a "Privatization Indices", similar to the Gear Indices, have
been constructed for 1998 and 2000 to provide composite measures for elite attitudes on
privatization. Both the 1998 (.8994) and the 2000 (.8912) indices recorded extremely high
alpha scores, pointing to above "good" levels of reliability. The following items have been
distilled, by means of principal component factor analysis, to constitute the aforementioned
indices:
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• More industries should be privatised;
• Privatization will mean higher consumer prices for services;
• Privatization is necessary to reduce the budget deficit;
• Privatization is necessary to ensure higher levels of productivity
• Privatization can act as a mainspring for black empowerment.
As results illustrated in Table 5 below, in the 1998 survey, privatization did not enjoy
overwhelming support amongst the ANC elite. Only 50 percent of the elite supported
privatization. As expected, among Cosatu's elites only 9.5 percent were positive about
privatization.
Another noticeable development in Table 5 is that the number of the indecisive elites is
quite high in the ANC at 25.9 percent compared to 4.1 percent in Cosatu elites.
When one looks at the elites opposed to privatization, Cosatu is number one with almost
85 percent of its elites opposed to privatization. However, the ANC elites are not that much
opposed to privatization, only 23.8 percent were opposed. In the 2000 survey, support for
privatization decreased to 46.7 percent among the ANC elites. The same also happened
to Cosatu, where the support for privatization decreased from 9.5 percent in 1998 to 4.0
percent in 2000. The 2000 survey shows that, in bath ANC and Cosatu, the number of the
indecisive elites increased from 25.9 in 1998 to 29.2 in 2000 in the ANC elites and from
4.8 to 6.0 percent in 2000 (in the Cosatu elites) respectively.
Bath the ANC and Cosatu seem to be consistent with their opposition to privatization. The
figures of the elites opposed to privatization increased in both the ANC and Cosatu. For
example in the ANC elites the figures increased from 23.8 in 1998 to 24.1 in 2000. And in
Cosatu the figures increased from 85.7 percent to 90.8 percent. This shows the
overwhelming opposition of Cosatu to Gear.
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Table 5: Support patterns for privatization among the ANC
Support ANC elites - ANC elites- COSATU COSATU
1998 2000 elites-1998 elites- 2000
Strongly Support 3.6% 5.8% 0.0% 0.0%
Support 46.8% 40.9% 9.5% 4.0%
Neither 25.9% 29.2% 4.8% 6.0.1%
Do not Support 18.0% 21.1% 61.9% 40.0%
Strongly do not Support 5.8% 2.9% 23.8% 50.8%
N (numbers) = 138 171 49 42
The low levels recorded in support for privatization amongst ANC elites in both the surveys
(1998 and 2000) may have been influenced by the massive job losses during the first two
years after the inception of Gear, making it unpopular, especially amongst the ANC's
alliance partners". Privatization, or restructuring as government referred to it, formed the
backbone of this policy. It can be argued that these initial negative implications of
privatization may have forced many amongst the ANC elite to have second thoughts about
the economic course that the organization has embarked upon.
The fact that almost 26% (25.9%) of the ANC elites were indecisive in 1998 and 29.2% in
2000 shows that privatization has been a major concern. It is rather surprising to note that
more than quarters of the ANC elites are unsure about privatization in both surveys.
5 From 1996 to 1998 about 186,000 formal (non-agricultural) jobs were lost (Adelzadeh: 1999:3).
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It is rather difficult to understand why this is the case, but certainly, this is not a result of
ignorance.
One can perhaps point out that the introduction of party discipline, as an argument, in the
ANC may shed some light on why this is the case. This party discipline is installed through
party caucuses that are meant to make sure that all the ANC Members of Parliament are
in support of party and government policies. And if a Member of Parliament or senior ANC
leader voiced out his/her opposition to government policies, the National Executive
Committee of the ANC can sanction that person. This may affect many ANC elites who do
not support privatization to respond by simply saying they are uncertain. However, the high
numbers of the ANC elites who are uncertain provide a fertile ground for COSATU to lobby
for the alternative economic policy to the current one implemented by the ANC.
3.2.3.4 Concluding remarks on attitudinal patterns
To conclude this chapter, it is rather difficult to pinpoint a clear dramatic shift in terms of
ideas pertaining to policy on the part of the ANC elites. What tends to complicate and
confuse matters is that the views expressed by the elite supporting the ANC do not, as a
matter of fact, necessarily translate into practical policy implementation. There is no
apparent link between views expressed by the ANC elites on economic policy matters and
the actual policies pursued and being implemented by the government. This tendency
crystallises itself when one look at Table 3 illustrating the percentage numbers of the ANC
elites in support of mixed economy compared to those in support of a free market
economy.
A mixed economy scored higher percentage points in terms of elite support from 1991 to
2000 compared to free market economy, which scored the lowest percentage points. What
do such findings tell us in the light of government commitment to Gear and privatisation?
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The findings suggest that the ANC elite may not be fully supportive of the erosion of the
state's role in the economy, whilst the government's implementation of Gear shows the
opposite.
Support for Gear, whilst pursued by the government, shows slight increase amongst the
ANC elite opposed to it, from 8.7 percent in 1998 to 10 percent in 2000 (see Table 4). Its
initial overwhelming support of 75.3 percent in 1998 may have been generated by the
expectations that it would save the country from the economic woes facing it. Instead it
brought about more job losses and delivered less on the projected economic growth. Gear
also does not point to a remarkable shift on the part of the ANC elite in terms of their
views. The dramatic decrease in its support in 2000 (see Table 5) to 47.9 percent points to
the fact that most elites probably lost faith to Gear after the perceived failures of the policy
framework. The increase of indecisive ANC elites from 5.1 percent in 1998 to 42 percent in
2000 points to the encroaching uncertainty on the part of ANC elites. It is possible that
some elites may be holding opposing views to government but lack audience on the
government side. This may be due to the introduction of party discipline, which does not
allow people within the ANC to oppose the current government policies.
The surge in the number of elites who are indecisive with respect to economic policy
options suggests either ambivalance or negative sentiments towards privatization as a
policy choice. For not more than 50 percent of the ANC elite support privatization in both
1998 and 2000 surveys.
These elites might be opposed to privatization but they are afraid to speak out because of
possible sanctions that may be applied by the NEC as the result of their actions. And this
is where Cosatu should focus their energies to lobby for its anti-privatization campaign.
Generally, when one considers state vs. the market, Gear and privatization there has been
a shift though not dramatically clear on the part of the ANC elite in terms of views on
policy. The ANC elite seems to differ with the policies being carried and implemented by
the government.
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Whilst government is seriously privatizing and restructuring, the ANC elite continues to
express views at variance with such actions. Having stated that, surely there has been a
shift in the ANC elite's position on policy from nationalization to mixed economy. And by
implication, recognizing the role of the private sector in the economy.
Perhaps one can deduce from the utterances attributed to Mbeki as to who drives Gear.
These statements seem to suggest that Mbeki sanctions and might be the brain behind the
implementation of Gear. In September 1996, Mbeki made it obvious that the government is
"absolutely committed to the implementation of the plan because there is no viable
alternative" (Sunday Times Business Times, 8 September 1996). On the possible impact a
policy such as Gear might have on the alliance cohesion, Mbeki argued that one" cannot
buy a political cohesion by doing the wrong things" (The Economist, 1st November 1997).
In 1996 Mbeki "pressed for the adoption of Gear as the cornerstone of ANC economic
policy" and together with Mandela "faced down a threatened revolt against Gear at the
SACP's 10th congress in July 1998" (OCOE, 1999:138). Mbeki further warned the SACP
on its criticism of Gear that its leaders "should not go around carrying the notion in [their]
heads that [they] have a special responsibility to be a revolutionary watchdog over the
ANC"(OCOE, 1999:112).
One can take a cue from the above statements that Mbeki is not only convinced but also
prepared to defend it. He views alternative policy options as not "viable" and criticize them
as "revolutionary". Contrary to SACP and COSATU's sentiments on Gear as a departure
from ideals, principles and approach espoused in the ROP, Mbeki views Gear as "an
elaboration of the ROP base document not its substitute" (Mbeki, 1998:138). However, it
would be unfair to suggest that Mbeki is solely responsible for Gear, he has a team, which
is the cabinet.
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Chapter Four
Concluding Remarks
4.1. Introduction
This chapter will briefly summarise the preceding chapters and give some concluding
remarks. It is arranged in the following format: each of the subsections summarizes one of
the preceding chapters respectively and the last section contains the concluding remarks.
The first chapter briefly presented the background of the study and the problem that was
going to be investigated. Furthermore, chapter one provided ways and means of
investigating the problem. The problem that was investigated is elite attitudes and the
ANC's shift from nationalization to privatization from 1990 up until 2000. The research
problem that this assignment attempted to investigate is the extent to which the ANC elite
has moved away from nationalization to privatization. This is investigated by looking at
both the current ANC policies that are implemented and the elite views and attitudes. The
descriptive method is used to describe the policy shift in the ANC. Firstly, a qualitative
method of data gathering is used to gather information on the evolution of the ANC
economic policy from 1990 up until 2000.
Secondly, quantitative methods are also used to gather information on their views on
nationalization and privatization. This became possible by analysing survey data that has
been collected by the Centre for International and Comparative Politics since 1990. The
data technique, which is used to analyse the data, is the Statistical Package for Social
Science (SPSS).
Chapter two described the shift from nationalization to privatization. This chapter is divided
into two sections, section one is the definition of the following concepts, nationalization,
privatization and elite, and section two is the chronology of the ANC shift in economic
policy in the 1990s.
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This research assignment discussed the following themes in details, the freedom charter
of 1955 and its economic clause, the process of shift from 1990 to 1994, the privatization
policy of the ANC from 1994 to 1996, the extent of nationalisation from 1996 to 2000, and
the reaction to privatisation policy in the post-apartheid era.
Chapter three's main aim was to report on the attitudinal position of the ANC elites on
following economic policy indicators, state versus market in the economy, does the ANC
elite support Gear and its controversial component privatization or not. There were six elite
surveys data that were analysed by means of SPSS technique.
4.2. Conclusion
In conclusion, the period prior to the 1990s and early 1990s marked the ANC's
commitment to nationalization but the latter part of 1990s up to 2000 has seen a shift from
nationalization as espoused in the Freedom Charter to privatization, the central element of
Gear. This, judging by statements of ANC leaders, occurred due to the disproportionate
role played by ANC elite on policy formulation. However, this does not imply that the
majority of the ANC elite has an influence on formulation and implementation. Why? The
surveys on the role of the state in relation to that of the market in the economy, for
instance, illustrate clearly that most ANC elites are in support of a mixed economy. Such
support is consistent in all six surveys.
The shift from nationalization to a mixed economy in terms of support on the part of the
ANC elite, suggest that the ANC elite may have come to realize a role for the private
sector in the economy.
The government, on the other hand, is rigorously and practically implementing policies that
are designed to erode the role of the state in the economy. The same applies to Gear and
privatization. For instance, the support for Gear decreased from 51.6 percent in 1998 to 47
percent in 2000.
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Notwithstanding Gear's dwindling support amongst the ANC elites, the government
continues to implement austerity measures as espoused by Gear. Now, the central
question one poses is: where is the shift that has been alluded to earlier on? Has there
been a shift at all on the part of the ANC elites, given the commitment by most of them to a
"mixed economy"? If indeed there has been a shift, what form has it taken?
One can conclude that there has been a shift and that it has taken the form of Gear. Gear,
though not a completely free market economic framework, seeks to minimize the state's
role in the economy through, for instance, full scale or partial privatization of SOEs, private
sector driven economic development and trade liberalization. Implicit in these measures is
that the state has assumed the role of a facilitator of market activities rather than a main
participant in the economy. This shift, however, is not clearly or fairly reflected in terms of
elite views as shown on surveys. If that is the case, one may possibly ask, why are the
majority of ANC elites not supportive of these policies and showing uncertainty as it
became apparent in the surveys?
The clue arguably, lies in the manner in which the whole process of privatization and
restructuring of the state assets has been conducted. For instance: "No legislated
instrument has been prepared and promulgated, both as means of encouraging debate,
and of allowing public (voters) representatives in parliament to participate in the
conceptualization and concretization of the programme. The programme has been driven
largely by sector ministers as well as by a sub-committee of the cabinet known as, the
Inter-Ministerial Cabinet Committee" (Shabalala, 1998:17).
This clearly shows that economic policy-making has been centralized in the executive arm
of the state. The ANC prides itself in its commitment to democracy; rigorous debates and
consultation, however, when it comes to economic policy-making that seems not to be the
case. It is becoming apparent under President Mbeki that economic policy-making is
slowly becoming an exclusive prerogative of the executive. This might be due to the
controversial nature of the economic policy.
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However, analysts such as Lodge (in Corrigan, 1999:79) argue that "Mbeki's policy
pronouncements have been demonstrably consistent and they are informed by a deeper
knowledge of the technicalities of economics and better understanding of the wider world
than is available to most of his colleagues". Lodge implies that Mbeki may have had a
preponderant role in economic policy formulation.
There are certain factors, which seem to impinge on the elite decision-making which
analysts such as Seepe (City Press, January 2, 2002) (whose views are expressed
elsewhere here) ignore or are oblivious to. Habib (2000:253 ) notes that government
decision-making has been influenced by the elite perception of the balance of power in the
economic arena. According to Habib (2000, 253-254) "the triumph of the market ideology
with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the power of the international lending
institutions- WB and IMF, international investors and domestic business community; are
the factors that have impinged on government decision-making" This sentiment seems to
be closer to that of Lodge. Seepe, appears to overlook the fact that Third World
governments are forced to take unpopular decisions, not out of their own volition but
simply because they are constrained to do so, by forces beyond their control. IMF and WB
induced austerity measures and neo-liberal policy prescriptions alienate Third World
governments from their constituencies (voters). And this is a phenomenon the Third World
has had to put up with, and has to be born in mind by the critics of the government.
Some analysts have described Mbeki as a "policyman, implementer and a technocrat"
(Hlope, in City Press, 02 January 2002). The hands-on nature of Mbeki's approach has,
according to other analysts, obscured subtle autocratic tendencies. Seepe, for instance,
observes that: "the president effectively controls all levers of power. He appoints not only
Cabinet Ministers but also Director-Generals and Premiers. He even has a final say on
who becomes a Mayor. ..people shall govern has been changed to party boss shall
govern"( City Press, January 2, 2002).
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Though there could perhaps, be an element of truth in Seepe's assessment of the
President (in the City Press 2 January 2002), it seems rather harsh and simplistic. Firstly,
Seepe alleges that Mbeki, as a person, is an autocrat that runs the ANC as a personal
fiefdom. If Seepe's observation is based on the account of policies such as Gear, Seepe
could be accused of selective observation. For he overlooked the fact that Gear was
formulated in the Mandela era and was declared "non-negotiable" then. Seepe's
allegations of autocratic tendencies never came to the fore or chose to overlook such
developments. Secondly, he tends to underrate the intellectual capacity of those that are
in both the National Executive of the ANC and in government.
Perhaps one can see, in the light of the above overall analysis, the reason why views
expressed by the majority of the elite are not necessarily reflected and translated into
government policy. This serves to show, also, that there is most probably a group of
cabinet ministers around Mbeki that help him to formulate government policy. If policy-
making is centralised the executive, taking into consideration the ANC's dominance, it is
obvious that some ANC elites would be reluctant to express their views freely on policy
matters. Views divergent to those of the president and his cabinet are likely to warrant
censure and possibly axing.
This study has also shown that it is most probably that the president has an inner circle -
cabinet ministers, that plays a disproportionate role in policy matters. A likelihood of
change in Gear and privatization may only occur if the current President is replaced.
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